“When the AEC had to choose between the necessity of atomic testing to maintain nuclear superiority over the Soviets and their serious concerns about radiation safety, conflicts were too often resolved in favor of the military requirements” (Ball, 39).
AEC Commissioner Willard Libby said in 1955, “people have got to learn to live with the facts of life, and part of the facts of life are fallout” (Ball, 74).
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AEC Commissioner Thomas E. Murray said in 1955, “We must not let anything interfere with this series of tests – nothing” (Ball, 74).
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AEC Commissioner Lewis L. Strauss said in 1955, “We have no alternative but to maintain our scientific and technical progress and maintain our strength at peak levels. The consequences of any other course would imperil our liberty, even our existence.”
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Stephen Brower: "I was in Iron County as the agricultural agent employed by Utah State University. The AEC made contact with me directly and provided me with a Geiger counter. I talked to Joe Sanders, the acting field manager from the AEC in Las Vegas. He notified me that there would be some fallout from the tests, to kind of be aware of it and to do some checking with the meter. They made a point of reassuring me that there was no problem, and encouraged me to reassure the local people that it would be negligible, and compared it to x-rays."
People would call him to tell him about all the sheep deaths that were happening. He went and tested them himself and his readings were off the scale. "One of the things that was most striking to me was that each time we pressed the AEC experts they'd say to us, 'we don't have any experience with radiation on sheep.' In fact, a man named Leo Bustad from Hanford talked to the livestock men and very specifically indicated with Paul Pearson, chief of biology and medicine with the AEC, that they didn't have any experience with radiation on sheep. Yet Bustad in 1950, three years before this time, had conducted extensive radiation experiments and had produced these kinds of results with sheep and lambing of ewes. I didn't know that {though} until 1976." He asked Pearson for a report of the studies Bower knew he had done. "When I didn't get it I called Pearson for it and he hedged. After two months he said it was picked up, every copy, and 'I've been asked to rewrite it with no reference to radiation.' I had a thorough talk with Pearson and asked him if it was radiation, what was the process by which the sheep men could get some redress. At that point he was very firm. He said there was no way they would allow this precedent to be set, or a claim to come against the AEC. He said it would jeopardize the testing program."
People would call him to tell him about all the sheep deaths that were happening. He went and tested them himself and his readings were off the scale. "One of the things that was most striking to me was that each time we pressed the AEC experts they'd say to us, 'we don't have any experience with radiation on sheep.' In fact, a man named Leo Bustad from Hanford talked to the livestock men and very specifically indicated with Paul Pearson, chief of biology and medicine with the AEC, that they didn't have any experience with radiation on sheep. Yet Bustad in 1950, three years before this time, had conducted extensive radiation experiments and had produced these kinds of results with sheep and lambing of ewes. I didn't know that {though} until 1976." He asked Pearson for a report of the studies Bower knew he had done. "When I didn't get it I called Pearson for it and he hedged. After two months he said it was picked up, every copy, and 'I've been asked to rewrite it with no reference to radiation.' I had a thorough talk with Pearson and asked him if it was radiation, what was the process by which the sheep men could get some redress. At that point he was very firm. He said there was no way they would allow this precedent to be set, or a claim to come against the AEC. He said it would jeopardize the testing program."
Statements Made in 1979 congressional Hearings:
The government said, “If responsibility is a description of a legal duty, the United States denies it had the responsibility of notifying its citizens of any potential health hazards. That determination [not to warn the citizens] is a matter properly the subject of executive discretion” (Ball,149)
Statements Made in the Allen Case:
Norris Edwin Bradbury, served as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory for 25 years from 1945 to 1970, he said, “Sure there are a few people with Leukemia. More people will get killed every hour from automobile accidents than will ever die of leukemia.” He also said that after looking at all the maps they picked Nevada because, “the population problem was almost zero.” |
“According to trial testimony unknown on-site personnel at
the Nevada Test Site altered the radiation exposure readings taken by monitors
in the local communities throughout the three-state area to ensure that the
measurements fell within the AEC standards” (Ball, 43).
Regarding Solutions like RECA:
“Legislators are wary of having a compensation program for the thousands of persons who were living downwind of the Nevada Test Site turn into a continuing, disruptive, draining entitlement program for other groups in the larger society who have also been injured and wrongfully killed due to government negligence.” (Ball, 177).
General Denials
“Given the townspeople’s heightened sensitivity to the radioactive issue, the Atomic Energy Commission had to address the downwinders use of Geiger counters. To combat stories about Geiger counters and their high radiation readings, the Atomic Energy Commission issued statements such as, ‘A Geiger counter can go completely off-scale in fallout which is far from hazardous.’” (Ball, 77).
May 8, 1952 Deseret News article, “S.L. A-Dust Declared Harmless,” was quoted as saying, “The AEC spokesman said he could not ‘emphasize too strongly the absence of dangerous effects from the radioactivity in the air over Salt Lake City’” (Ball, 66).
Harold A. Knapp, a Defense Department analyst, recalled his conversation with a deputy director of the AEC’s Division of Operational Safety. “’When I told [him] how high the dosage levels were, the director had this pitch: ‘Well, look, we’ve told these people all along that it’s safe and we can’t change our story now; we’ll be in trouble’” (Ball, 45).
May 8, 1952 Deseret News article, “S.L. A-Dust Declared Harmless,” was quoted as saying, “The AEC spokesman said he could not ‘emphasize too strongly the absence of dangerous effects from the radioactivity in the air over Salt Lake City’” (Ball, 66).
Harold A. Knapp, a Defense Department analyst, recalled his conversation with a deputy director of the AEC’s Division of Operational Safety. “’When I told [him] how high the dosage levels were, the director had this pitch: ‘Well, look, we’ve told these people all along that it’s safe and we can’t change our story now; we’ll be in trouble’” (Ball, 45).